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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the court of appeals correctly reversed the jury verdict of no causation
on grounds unrelated to the verdict or the issues raised by the parties.
2. Whether the court of appeals correctly ruled that jury instructions 16a and 21a
regarding proof of negligence and proximate cause misstate Utah law and require a new
trial.
OPINIONS BELOW
The slip opinion of the court of appeals is reproduced in the Appendix hereto
(App. 1-10, hereafter referred to as "Slip Op.") and is reported at 142 U.A.R. 27 (Utah
App. 1990). The Special Verdict of the jury and Final Judgment of the district court are
also set forth in the Appendix. (App. 11-17.)
JURISDICTION
The decision of the court of appeals was entered August 31, 1990. On September
26, 1990 this Court entered an Order extending the time within which to petition for
certiorari to October 31, 1990. This Court has jurisdiction to review the court of appeals
decision by a writ of certiorari pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5).
CONTROLLING AUTHORITIES
This case is governed by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 49, 51, 59, and 61, which
are set out verbatim in the Appendix. (App. 37-42.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a medical malpractice action in which plaintiff alleges that the injuries and
death of his wife, Betty George, were caused by the negligent care of her physicians, Dr.
Kimball Lloyd and Dr. Michael Lahey, and LDS Hospital (the "Hospital"). The defendant
physicians entered into a settlement with plaintiff prior to trial.

They nevertheless

remained parties and were represented at trial for the purpose of apportioning any liability
of the defendants. (Slip Op. at 1; R. 2; PL Opening Statement p. 21; Trial Transcript,
hereafter "Tr.,f, p. 853.) Following a jury trial, the jury rendered a Special Verdict finding
that the defendant physicians were not negligent, that the Hospital nurses and respiratory
therapists were negligent, but that their negligence was not a proximate cause of Mrs.
George's injuries and death. (Slip Op. at 1; R. 397, App. 11.) Plaintiff filed a motion for
new trial, which was denied. The district court subsequently entered its Final Judgment
on the verdict in favor of all three defendants. (Slip Op. at 2; R. 587, 709, App. 15.)
Plaintiff appealed, challenging the refusal and giving of certain jury instructions
related to proof of causation, the Special Verdict form, and other minor rulings. (Slip Op.
at 2; R. 739.) The court of appeals, in an opinion authored by Judge Davidson, who was
not present at the oral argument and who resigned from the court the same day the
opinion was released, set aside the jury verdict and ordered a new trial on grounds wholly
unrelated to the verdict and the issues raised by the parties. The court held that a new
trial was required because jury instructions 16a and 21a, detailed hereafter, precluded the
jury from considering expert testimony on breach of duty and from finding Hospital
negligence a contributing cause of Mrs. George's death. (Slip Op. at 5, 7, 9.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Betty George was a 51-year-old woman with a long history of health problems,
including diabetes, hypertension, and obesity. In the summer of 1986, Mrs. George was
found to have a tumor in her uterus and also began experiencing continuous vaginal
bleeding. For these latter problems she was referred to Dr. Kimball Lloyd, a specialist
in obstetrics and gynecology. Dr. Lloyd admitted Mrs. George to LDS Hospital on July

2

28, 1986 for exploratory surgery and a hysterectomy. Dr. Lloyd performed the surgery the
next day without apparent complication. (Slip Op. at 2; Partial Transcript, hereafter Tart.
Tr.H, at 36-45; Tr. 351, 359; Trial Exhibit, hereafter "Ex.", 1 pp. 4, 12, 56.)
On August 1, Mrs. George began showing signs of a respiratory problem. Dr.
Lloyd ordered various tests to determine the cause of the problem, but the results were
inconclusive.

Dr. Lloyd then contacted Dr. Michael Lahey, a specialist in internal

medicine, to assist him in diagnosing the problem.

After Dr. Lahey examined Mrs.

George and her test results that evening, both doctors diagnosed the problem as
pulmonary embolism, which is the presence of a blood clot in the lungs that prevents
oxygenation of the blood and results in shortness of breath (hypoxemia). However, a
pulmonary angiogram performed the morning of August 2, failed to confirm this diagnosis.
Dr. Lahey examined Mrs. George again following the angiogram and found her condition
generally the same as the previous evening. (Slip Op. at 2; Tr. 82-83, 368-85, 504-15, 56686; Ex. 1 pp. 13, 90.)
Mrs. George was returned to her room at approximately 2:30 p.m. and

was

assigned a special duty nurse. Her condition began to show signs of worsening during the
later afternoon of August 2. The nurse summoned Dr. Adams, a resident physician, who
examined Mrs. George and called Dr. Lloyd at 4:15 p.m. Dr. Lloyd ordered certain tests
for infection, but because he did not issue the order "stat," requiring immediate
performance, the test results were not expected for two to three hours. Dr. Adams
examined Mrs. George again at 5:00 p.m. and found no change from the previous
examination. At 6:30 p.m. Dr. Adams received some of the requested test results, ordered
medication, and instructed the nurse to call him immediately to report any changes in the
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patient's mental status. The nurse called Dr. Adams at 7:00 p.m. and reported that Mrs.
George was not responsive. Dr. Adams went directly to examine Mrs. George and,
finding no heart rate, summoned the emergency resuscitation team, but the team was
unable to revive her. Dr. lioyd and Dr. Lahey subsequently diagnosed Mrs. George's
condition as sepsis, an overwhelming bacterial infection. (Slip Op. at 2-3; Tr. 85-86, 390404, 586-97, 689-716; Ex. 1 pp. 32, 169-71.)
Plaintiff subsequently commenced this action asserting both wrongful death and
survival claims on behalf of the heirs and the estate. As noted previously, the defendant
physicians settled with plaintiff out of court, but were represented as parties at trial for
purposes of apportioning liability. (Slip Op. at 1; R. 2; PL Open. Stat. p. 21; Tr. 853.)'
At trial, plaintiff presented the expert testimony of Harriet Gillerman, a nurse,
and Donald Owing, a respiratory therapist, regarding the standards of hospital care, the
claimed breach of those standards, and the claimed result in proximately causing Mrs.
George's injuries and death. (Tr. 169, 276.) Plaintiff presented no expert testimony from
a physician regarding the breach of duty and proximate cause of the injuries and death,
although he had previously secured such a witness. The Hospital, on the other hand,
presented the expert testimony of three physicians, Dr. John Trowbridge, an expert in the
diagnosis of infectious processes; Dr. Louis Weinstein, an expert in obstetrical and
gynecological infections; and Dr. Charles Elliot, an expert in respiratory medicine. All
three physicians testified that Mrs. George's arrest was caused by sepsis, probably
emanating from the surgery; that the process of cascading infection was irreversible by the

1

Plaintiff initially alleged that the Hospital was vicariously liable for the negligence of the student resident physicians,
including Doctors Bearnson, Adams and others, who were employed by the University of Utah Medical Center. (R. 9.)
However, consistent with the law, plaintiff later abandoned that theory, and the jury was properly instructed that no failure
of any of the physicians, including the student residents, could be attributed to the Hospital. (Instruction 31, R. 529.)
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time Mrs. George returned from the ICU on the afternoon of August 2; and that nothing
the Hospital staff could have done after that time would have changed her condition or
prevented her death. (Trowbridge: Tr. 530-41; Weinstein: Tr. 640-44, 656-58; Elliot: Tr.
752-64, 772-73, 780-81.) The jury obviously accorded more weight and credibility to the
Hospital's experts, finding in a Special Verdict that while the Hospital staff breached the
standard of care, that breach was not the proximate cause of Mrs. George's injuries and
death. (Slip Op. at 1, 5-8; R. 397-99, App. 11-14.) The district court entered Final
Judgment in favor of the defendants, and plaintiff appealed, challenging principally the
jury instructions related to proof of causation. (R. 709, App. 15-17, R. 739.)
Plaintiff argued in the court of appeals that the verdict should be set aside because
(1) the district court refused plaintiffs proposed jury instructions 24 and 32 pertaining to
"increased risk of injury" and "lost chance of survival"; (2) jury instructions 16a and 21a
erroneously required plaintiff to establish the proximate cause of Mrs. George's death
through expert physician testimony; (3) the Special Verdict form failed to allow
consideration of pre-death injuries; (4) the district court improperly denied plaintiffs
motion for directed verdict in favor of the defendant physicians; and (5) the district court
erred in the amount of costs awarded.2 The Hospital countered that (1) there was no
error in the refusal of proposed jury instructions 24 and 32 because plaintiff failed to
object to the refusal, and the proposed instructions are contrary to Utah law; (2) jury
instructions 16a and 21a accurately set forth Utah law regarding the manner and burden
of proving causation; (3) plaintiffs challenge to the Special Verdict form was not timely
raised, and the language did cover pre-death injuries; (4) there was sufficient evidence of

2

Plaintiffs arguments in his brief to the court of appeals were numerous, ill-defined, scattered, and repetitious. This
summary represents a good faith effort to distill plaintiff's arguments into the major points.
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the physicians' negligence to preclude a directed verdict; and (5) there was no error in the
award of costs. 3
The court of appeals opinion focuses exclusively on the challenge to jury
instructions 16a and 21a (Slip Op. at 4-5); all other issues were disregarded. Moreover,
the court examined those instructions on narrow grounds unrelated to the verdict or the
parties' actual arguments. The court reviewed the testimony of plaintiffs experts, Owings
and Gillerman, but only insofar as it pertained to the Hospital's breach of duty. The
court then held the instructions deficient, not on grounds related to causation, but because
(1) they prevented the jury from considering plaintiffs expert testimony on breach of duty
(Slip Op. at 5-7); and (2) they "improperly implied that the jury could find only one
proximate cause of Mrs. George's death" (id. at 9). Based on these supposed errors, the
court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial against the Hospital alone. (Id.)
ARGUMENT
Rule 46(c), Utah R. App. P., states that this Court may grant review by writ of
certiorari "[w]hen a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that has so far
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings . . . as to call for an
exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision." This is just such a case. The
appeal raised several important issues, but the court of appeals failed to address any of
them. The verdict for the Hospital was based on absence of proximate cause, and the
arguments of the parties on appeal focused on the issue of proximate cause; yet, the
court of appeals decision is based on breach of duty, which neither party questioned. The
plaintiff did not even challenge the jury instructions on the grounds relied upon by the

3

Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court obtain copies of the parties' briefs from the court of appeals to verify
the scope and content of the respective arguments.
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court of appeals. Moreover, the grounds relied upon are without support in the record
or the law.

If the court of appeals decision is permitted to stand, it will infuse

unnecessary conflict and confusion into the law of medical malpractice and negligence law
generally. Additionally, the issues that should have been decided by the court of appeals
are important questions of first impression which should be settled by this Court. See
generally Rule 46, Utah R. App. P.
POINT I:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY REVERSED THE JURY
VERDICT OF NO CAUSATION ON GROUNDS UNRELATED TO THE
VERDICT AND THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE PARTIES.

The court of appeals opinion violates several long-established rules of appellate
review. The function of an appellate court is to resolve appeals based on the issues
actually decided in the trial court and fairly presented on appeal. See, e.g., Chase v. State
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 131 Ariz. 461, 641 P.2d 1305, 1307 n.2 (App. 1982). On
appeal from a jury verdict, the appellate court must begin with the presumption that the
verdict is correct. Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 10 Utah 2d 94, 348
P.2d 935, 938 (1960). The court must view the verdict and the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party, accord the evidence every reasonable inference in
support of the verdict, and assume that the jury believed those aspects of the evidence
which support the verdict. The reviewing court may reverse a jury verdict only if the
supporting evidence is so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly
unreasonable and unjust. Above all, the appellate court may not substitute its judgment
for that of the jury. See EA. Strout Western Realty Agency v. W.C. Foy & Sons, Inc., 665
P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1983); Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 172 (Utah 1983); Deals
v. Commercial Security Bank, 746 P.2d 1191, 1192 (Utah App. 1987). The burden is on
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the appellant to show not only that there was error, but that it was prejudicial to the
extent that in its absence there would have been a different result. Joseph, supra, 348
P.2d at 938.
In this case, the court of appeals totally missed the major issues, construed the facts
against the verdict, and searched beyond the parties' arguments for supposed grounds to
substitute its judgment for that of the jury. The entire decision is based on alleged error
in two jury instructions, 16a and 21a, pertaining to proof of negligence generally and
causation specifically. The two errors identified by the court of appeals are that the
challenged instructions (1) precluded the jury from considering the testimony of plaintiffs
experts on breach of duty; and (2) precluded the jury from finding that Hospital
negligence was a contributing proximate cause of the claimed injuries. Neither assigned
error has any basis in fact or law.
A. Expert Testimony
As documented in the Statement of Facts, the Special Verdict asked the jury three
basic questions: First, whether the defendants were negligent; second, if so, whether such
negligence was the proximate cause of the claimed injuries; and third, if there was
negligence and causation, the amount of damages attributable to each defendant. (App.
11-13.) 4 The jury found that the Hospital was negligent, but that its negligence was not
the proximate cause of the claimed injuries. (App. 12-13.) Consequently, the primary
issue on appeal, stated by plaintiff in various repetitious ways, was not whether the

4

"Negligence" was defined in jury instructions 22 through 30 to mean, in essence, the failure of a defendant to
provide the standard of care provided by other reasonably prudent health care practitioners under similar circumstances.
(App. 25-34.) "Proximate cause" was defined in jury instructions 21 and 21a to mean, in essence, the act or omission that,
in natural and continuous sequence produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. (App.
23-24.)
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Hospital breached its duty to Mrs. George, but whether that breach proximately caused
her death. Plaintiff argued on appeal that jury instructions 16a and 21a precluded the jury
from finding proximate cause because they required that causation be established through
expert testimony from a duly qualified medical doctor. At trial, for whatever reason,
plaintiff had determined not to call his expert physician witness and introduced expert
testimony only from a nurse and respiratory therapist. The Hospital demonstrated that
the instructions were consistent with Utah law and that plaintiff should bear the
consequences of his counsel's conscious decision not to call his expert physician witness
to testify.

The issue

thus framed was not whether the challenged jury instructions

precluded the jury from considering plaintiffs expert testimony on breach of duty, but
whether they precluded the jury from considering the expert testimony on causation.
The court began by rehashing all the facts relevant to breach of duty, and stated
those facts in a light favorable to plaintiff. The court then reviewed the testimony of
plaintiffs two experts, again, not with respect to causation, but for evidence of breach of
duty. The court cited testimony of both experts that Hospital employees "breached their
duty" to Mrs. George.

(Slip Op. at 5-6.)

The court of appeals summarized and

concluded:
The record clearly indicates, however, that Gillerman and Owings testified
only to the standards of care in their respective fields. . . . [Y]et the court,
through the jury instructions, prevented the jury from considering their
testimony.
. . . Plaintiffs experts testified as to the hospital's standard of care,
the hospital's failure through its employees to meet this standard, and Mrs.
George's subsequent cardiac arrest.
The jury must be allowed to decide whether the hospital's failure to notify
the doctors of Mrs. George's change in medical status . . . was a breach of
the duty owed to Mrs. George. The trial court erred in not allowing the jury
9

to base its decision on the plaintiffs' expert testimony. [Slip Op. at 6-7,
emp. added.]
The court made no mention of causation. Nor did the court bother to identify the
language in jury instructions 16a and 21a that it considered objectionable. The court
simply held, with regard to plaintiffs experts, that the challenged jury instructions
somehow precluded the jury from considering their testimony on "breach of the duty."
Obviously, the court of appeals confused the issues. The record plainly shows that
the jury did consider plaintiffs evidence on breach of duty. The jury found that the
Hospital was negligent. Plaintiff does not need a new trial for the jury "to decide whether
the hospital's failure . . . was a breach of the duty."

Accordingly, the court of appeals

ruling regarding the effect of the instructions on plaintiffs expert testimony is erroneous.
B.

Contributing Causation
In the second part of its opinion, the court of appeals misconstrued another issue.

Plaintiff argued on appeal that the district court erred in refusing his proposed jury
instructions 24 and 32 pertaining to "increased risk of injury" and "lost chance of survival."
(App. 35-36.) The claimed effect was to preclude a finding that the Hospital's negligence
was a contributing cause of Mrs. George's death. The Hospital demonstrated that there
was no error because plaintiff failed to object to the refusal, and such instructions are
contrary to Utah law. With the issue thus framed, the court of appeals launched into a
discussion of whether jury instructions 16a and 21a precluded a finding of contributing
causation. Viewing the facts in a light favorable to plaintiff, the court concluded:
A jury could have reasonably concluded that the failure of the nurses
to notify Dr. Lloyd or Dr. Lahey of Mrs. George's change in condition
prevented them from diagnosing, treating, and possibly saving her life and
that this failure therefore was a proximate cause of her worsened condition
and ensuing death. [Citation omitted.] The trial court's jury instructions
10

therefore improperly implied that the jury could find only one proximate
cause of Mrs. George's death. [Slip Op. at 9.]
This reasoning is hopelessly flawed and confused. The court makes no mention of
proposed instructions 24 and 32, on which plaintiff based the argument. Moreover, the
court offers no explanation of how jury instructions 16a and 21a, on which the court bases
its opinion, implied that there could only be one proximate cause. The court simply
remands for a new trial, without explaining which jury instructions should or should not
be included. Proposed instructions 24 and 32 have no basis in Utah law, and the actual
jury instructions do not preclude a finding of more than one proximate cause, as
demonstrated hereafter. Moreover, instead of searching the record for what the jury
"could have reasonably concluded," the court should have been reviewing the record for
evidence to support the verdict. Accordingly, the decision must be reversed.
In summary, the court of appeals opinion plainly calls for the exercise of this
Court's power of supervision.
POINT II:

JURY INSTRUCTIONS 16A AND 21A CORRECTLY STATE UTAH
LAW ON PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE AND
DO NOT REQUIRE REVERSAL OF THE JURY VERDICT.

As stated in Rule 51, Utah R. Civ. P. (App. 39), review of jury instructions is
discretionary with the appellate court. On appeal, no party may assign as error the giving
of a jury instruction unless specific objection was made to the instruction at trial. See EA.
Strout Western Realty, supra, 665 P.2d at 1322. The giving of a challenged instruction is
reversible error only if it tends to confuse or mislead the jury to the prejudice of the
complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advises on the law. See, e.g., Mikkelsen
v. Haslam, 764 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah App. 1988); Steele v. Breinholt, 141 P.2d 433, 435
(Utah App. 1987). Jury instructions must be examined as a whole, and the giving or
11

refusal of an instruction is not prejudicial if the matter is fairly and adequately covered
in other instructions. Goode v. Dayton Disposal, Inc., 738 P.2d 638, 640 (Utah 1987); Bigler
v. Mapleton Irrigation Canal Co., 669 P.2d 434, 437 (Utah 1983). Under these standards
of review, there is no reversible error in jury instructions 16a and 21a.
A.

Instructions 16a and 21a Correctly State Utah Law
The court of appeals quoted jury instructions 16a and 21a, but gave no discussion

of their content. (Slip Op. at 4-5.) Instruction 16a sets forth the required elements of
proof for recovery in a medical malpractice action. It states that plaintiff cannot recover
against defendants unless he proves that (1) one of the defendants breached their duty of
care to Mrs. George; (2) the breach was the proximate cause of Mrs. George's death; and
(3) plaintiff, on behalf of the heirs and estate, incurred a resulting injury. (App. 21-22.)
Instruction 21a sets forth the required proof for the proximate cause element of the cause
of action. It states that if plaintiff does not establish the proximate cause of Mrs.
George's death "based on reasonable medical probability from testimony of a medical
doctor, but is left to conjecture or speculation and may be reasonably attributed to causes
over which the hospital or doctor had no control or responsibility, then the plaintiff has
failed to sustain the burden of proof as to proximate causation." (App. 24.) These
instructions are consistent with well-established Utah law.
Medical negligence must be established through expert testimony to a degree of
reasonable medical probability. As stated in Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health Care,
740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah App. 1987):
In medical malpractice actions the plaintiff must provide expert
testimony to establish: 1) the standard of care; 2) defendant's failure to
comply with that standard; and 3) that defendant caused plaintiffs injuries.
Further, issues of fact which are outside the knowledge and experience of
12

lay persons must be established by expert testimony. [Citations omitted.]
The Hoopiiaina court affirmed summary judgment for the hospital because the plaintiff
failed to establish causation through expert medical testimony. Id. See also Farrow v.
Health Services Corp., 604 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah 1979); Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 354
n.17 (Utah 1980)(proof of proximate cause "requires some expert testimony in medical
malpractice cases"); Huggins v. Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P.2d 523, 526 (1957)("in a
malpractice action, expert testimony must be produced to show that the injuries alleged
were probably caused by the lack of due care of defendant"); Swan v. Lamb, 584 P.2d
814, 816 (Utah 1978)(approved expert opinion "with probable medical certainty as to what
caused the injuries").
Moreover, in the present case, causation must be established through expert
medical testimony of a physician, rather than that of merely a nurse or respiratory
therapist, as offered by plaintiff. In Fredrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah 385, 227 P.2d 772, 773
(1951), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
The better-reasoned cases announce a rule of law to the effect that
in those cases which depend upon knowledge of the scientific effect of
medicine, the results of surgery, or whether the attending physician exercised
the ordinary care, skill and knowledge required of doctors in the community
which he serves, must ordinarily be established by the testimony of physicians
and surgeons. [Emp. added.]
The Court reaffirmed this requirement in Huggins v. Hicken, supra, holding that the
standard for postoperative care of a gall bladder patient "should be established by the
testimony of physicians and surgeons." 310 P.2d at 525. The reasons for this requirement
are two-fold. First, evaluation and determination of a medical condition and its cause
comprise the essence of "diagnosis," which, under Utah law, constitutes the "practice of
medicine," and can be engaged in only by a licensed physician. U.C.A. 58-12-28; Tolman
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v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 682, 684 (D. Utah 1986). Second, an expert in one
field of medicine is not qualified to testify on matters uniquely within the knowledge of
experts in a higher, more complex, or more specialized field of medicine. See Burton v.
Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1985); Novey v. Kishwaukee Community Health
Services Center, 531 N.E.2d 427 (III App. 1988). Accordingly, neither a nurse nor a
respiratory therapist is qualified to testify as to the cause of Mrs. George's death. See
Jones v. Wike, 654 F.2d 1129, 1130 (5th Cir. 1981) (registered nurse not qualified as expert
on post operative care of hernia patient). Cases dealing with injuries of uncertain origin,
such as sepsis, require expert physician testimony. See Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah 262,
139 P.2d 216, 220 (1943) (failure to diagnose "general septicemia"); Forrest v. Eason, 123
Utah 610, 261 P.2d 178, 180 (1953) (brain injury related to bacteriemia); Marsh v.
Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108 (1959) (death of foot tissue following triple
arthrodesis).
The law requires proof of proximate cause to a degree of "reasonable medical
probability" because a showing of mere "increased risk of injury" or "reduced chance of
recovery" is too speculative. For example, in the leading case of Edwards v. Clark, 96
Utah 121, 83 P.2d 1021 (1938), the Court upheld a directed verdict for the defendant
physicians on facts similar to those of the present case. The plaintiffs wife gave birth to
a child; the mother seemed fine until about four days later when she developed a fever
and high pulse rate; her doctors examined her periodically and prescribed certain
medication, but did not discover her uterine infection for four more days; she died two
days later of septic toxemia. Id, 83 P.2d at 1023. Regarding the deficiency of evidence
on causation, the Court stated:
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There is nothing arising out of the case that shows anything the defendants
could or should have done that would or could have changed the unfortunate
result. . . .
. . . That there might have been neglect or lack of skill is not enough.
To permit a cause to go to the jury on testimony showing only possibility,
or what might or could have happened, is to permit a jury to base a verdict
upon conjecture, speculation or suspicion. [Id. at 1029-30.]
See also Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P.2d 257, 263, 265 (1931) ("[I]t is not enough to
show the injury, together with the expert opinion that it might have occurred from
negligence and many other causes.

Such evidence has no tendency to show that

negligence did cause the injury." Emp. added.)
Plaintiff would have the jury presume causation from the co-existence of Mrs.
George's suffering and the Hospital's negligence. However, ff[t]he fact that the plaintiff
was injured does not raise a presumption or authorize an inference that the defendants'
acts or omissions proximately caused the injury." Jackson v. Colston, 116 Utah 295, 209
P.2d 566, 569 (1949). Moreover, "[t]here is nothing unlawful or inconsistent in a jury's
finding that while a defendant is negligent, his negligence did not proximately cause the
plaintiffs injury." Schmidt v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 99, 101 (Utah
1981). A plaintiff may not "rest his case on the mere facts of his sufferings, and . . . rely
upon the jury's untutored sympathies, without attempting specifically to evidence the
defendant's unskillfulness as the cause of those sufferings." Baxter v. Snow, supra, 2 P.2d
at 265.
In summary, jury instructions 16a and 21a correctly state the law of Utah regarding
proof of causation through expert medical testimony.
B.

Plaintiff Did Not Specifically Object To The Instructions
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As noted above, Rule 51, U.R. Civ. P., requires that a party objecting to the giving
of a jury instruction "must state distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds
for his objection." (Add. 39; see also Rule 49, App. 37.) Nonspecific objections, such as
the instruction "is not supported by the evidence" or "does not correctly state the law," are
insufficient to apprise the district court of the claimed error. Beehive Medical Electronics,
Inc. v. Square D Co., 669 P.2d 859, 861 (Utah 1983).

Moreover, "[e]xpansion on

nonspecific objections in a motion for a new trial or in a brief on appeal, as plaintiff did
in this case, does not cure the lack of timeliness in making proper objections to the trial
court." Id. See also Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573, 579 (Utah
1985). At trial, plaintiff objected to instruction 16a solely on the grounds that it ,!was
confusing to the jury" and "is also contrary to law." (Tr. 894-97.) These grounds are not
sufficiently specific. Plaintiff objected to instruction 21a on the sole basis that it required
him to prove that the Hospital's negligence proximately caused Mrs. George's death. (Tr.
889-91.) However, such proof is always necessary in a wrongful death action. See 22A
Am. Jur. 2d, Death § 48 (1988). Plaintiff never objected to instructions 16a and 21a on
the grounds addressed by the court of appeals. Accordingly, supposed error in those
instructions cannot serve as a basis for a new trial.
C.

Instructions 16a and 21a Did Not Preclude Consideration of Expert Testimony On
Breach Of Duty
As detailed in Point I, above, the court of appeals apparently confused causation,

which was at issue, with breach of duty, which was not at issue. The court's review of the
testimony of plaintiffs experts focuses entirely on breach of duty; causation is never
mentioned. In fact, the court states that plaintiffs experts testified "only to the standards
of care." (Slip Op. at 6.) The court's conclusion is that "[t]he jury must be allowed to
16

decide whether the hospital's failure to notify the doctors . . . was a breach of the duty."
(Slip Op. at 7.)
However, nothing in instructions 16a and 21a prevented the jury from considering
and deciding whether the Hospital breached its duty. Instruction 16a expressly requires
the jury to consider whether defendants "failed to exercise that degree of reasonable care
and skill in caring for the plaintiff that was ordinarily possessed and used by others in the
respective profession practicing in . . . similar communities under similar circumstances."
(App. 21-22.) Obviously, the jury considered and applied this instruction because it found
that the Hospital did breach its duty of care. (App. 12.) Nothing could possibly be
gained from retrying the issue of breach of duty. Instruction 21a has nothing to do with
breach of duty; it pertains only to proof of proximate cause. (App. 24.) It could not
possibly have had any bearing on the jury's consideration of breach of duty. Neither did
the court of appeals make any mention or give any indication that instruction 21a
erroneously instructed the jury on proof of causation. Whether that is what the court was
thinking or intended is, of course, impossible to tell. The court's express holding is limited
to the notion that instructions 16a and 21a precluded consideration of expert testimony
oh breach of duty. That actual holding is plainly wrong.
D.

Instructions 16a and 21a Did Not Preclude A Finding Of More Than One
Proximate Cause
The court of appeals focused on the Hospital's breach of duty to conclude that the

Hospital staff may have contributed to Mrs. George's demise by increasing the risk of
harm to her or by depriving her of a chance for earlier treatment. The court ordered a
new trial because jury instructions 16a and 21a "improperly implied that the jury could
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find only one proximate cause of Mrs. George's death." (Slip Op. at 9.) However, the
court completely confused the relevant issues.
To begin with, neither of the challenged instructions states that the jury could find
only one proximate cause of Mrs. George's death. They speak of proximate cause in the
general sense. Moreover, jury instruction 21, which defines "proximate cause," expressly
states that M[t]here may be more than one proximate cause for an injury." (App. 23.)
The instructions must be read as a whole, and the jury was so instructed. (Instruction 5,
App. 19.) See Goode v. Dayton Disposal, supra. Accordingly, when viewed in conjunction
with Instruction 21, Instructions 16a and 21a clearly do not "impl[y] that the jury could
find only one proximate cause."
Plaintiff made the argument of contributing proximate cause in the context of his
proposed jury instructions 24 and 32, pertaining to "increased risk of injury" and "lost
chance of survival," respectively. (App. 35-36.) However, plaintiff failed to preserve the
argument for appeal by objecting to refusal of the instructions in the trial court. See
Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354, 358 n.7 (Utah 1975)(party must have proposed correct
instruction and excepted to the trial court's failure to give it); Newsome v. Gold Cross
Services, Inc., 779 P.2d 692 (Utah App. 1989)(plaintiff precluded from asserting error in
denial of "lost chance of survival" instruction). Furthermore, proposed instructions 24 and
32 have no support in Utah law. As demonstrated above, a showing of mere "increased
risk of injury" or "reduced chance of recovery" is too slender a reed on which to base
malpractice liability.

Utah law requires proof of proximate cause to a degree of

"reasonable medical probability.19 The Hospital's expert physician witnesses all testified that
while sepsis "may be reversible" and "may be treatable" in some cases, nothing the Hospital
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staff could have done in this case would have changed Mrs. George's condition or
prevented her death. In other words, even if the nurses had notified the doctors at the
times identified by the court of appeals, the outcome would not have changed because
Mrs. George's condition was, by that time, irreversible. The jury reasonably believed that
evidence; its verdict is supported by that evidence; and the court of appeals may not
substitute its judgment for that of the jury.
In summary, instructions 16a and 21a did not preclude a finding of contributing
proximate cause, and plaintiffs proposed instructions 24 and 32 were properly not
considered on appeal.
E.

The Jury Instructions Taken As A Whole Reveal No Prejudicial Error
Rule 61, Utah R. Civ. P., prohibits the ordering of a new trial unless the claimed

error affects the "substantial rights" of the claiming party. (App. 42.) If the verdict would
likely have been the same even without the challenged instructions, then any claimed error
must be considered harmless. See Ramon v. Fair, 770 P.2d 131, 137 (Utah 1989). In this
case, the court of appeals was mistaken as to the scope and effect of jury instructions 16a
and 21a, and the court did not prescribe any additional instructions. Accordingly, a new
trial, even without the challenged instructions, would likely have the same result. See
Watters v. Queny, 626 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah 1981)(flaw in instructions related to negligence
cannot justify reversal of judgment based on lack of causation alone).
In denying plaintiffs motion for new trial, Judge Brian also concluded that any
error in the trial was harmless:
The law never contemplated, in all of the annals of recorded case law, that
a given case would be without error. It would be impossible for a trial to
be error free.
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The Court has carefully considered all of the assertions and allegations
and factors asserted by Plaintiff, in Plaintiffs motion for a new trial. The
Court is convinced and persuaded that error may well have been committed
by all of the participants in this case. But the Court is strongly persuaded
that any error committed, in the totality of the trial, was harmless, that the
trial was fair, that the case was vigorously presented, the jury was properly
instructed, and that the verdict was a fair and an appropriate verdict, in light
of the facts and the law. [Tr. of Motion for New Trial, R. 770, pp. 34-35.]
In summary, there is no basis for a new trial. See Rule 59, Utah R. Civ. P. (App. 4041.)
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should grant the Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to correct the errors in this decision of the court of appeals and to dispel the confusion
that it creates in the law of medical malpractice.
DATED this M^~ day of October, 1990.

Respectfully submitted,
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN

Brinton R. Burbidge
Merrill F. Nelson
Attorneys for Defendant-Petitioner
LDS Hospital
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DAVIDSON, Judge:
Plaintiffs, the husband and heirs of decedent Betty
George, sought recovery in a wrongful death action against LDS
Hospital, Dr. Kimball Lloyd, and Dr. Michael Lahey. Plaintiffs
appeal from a jury verdict finding that defendant LDS Hospital
was negligent in its care of Mrs. George, but that defendant's
negligence was not a proximate cause of Mrs. George's death.
Dr. Lloyd and Dr. Lahey reached a settlement with the
plaintiffs prior to trial, although the doctors remained in the
case for purposes of determining comparative negligence. The
jury concluded that the doctors were not negligent and assigned
100 percent responsibility to the hospital.

Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial was denied by the trial
court. On appeal, plaintiffs claim that the trial court
committed reversible error in the jury instructions. We
reverse and remand for a new trial.
FACTS
On July 28, 1986, Dr. Lloyd admitted Mrs. George to LDS
Hospital for a hysterectomy and exploratory surgery. The
surgery was performed on July 29 without apparent
complications. On the morning of July 30, Dr. Lloyd ordered
that Mrs. George be ambulated four times daily, that she
receive incentive spirometry1 every hour while awake, and
that the nurses instruct her to cough and breathe deeply. This
treatment was intended to increase Mrs. George's breath
capacity, which is typically depressed following a patient's
abdominal surgery.
Mrs. George's breathing deteriorated during July 31. On
the morning of August 1, Dr. Lloyd ordered that a chest X-ray
and lung profusion scan be taken to determine whether Mrs.
George had a pulmonary embolism. Although these tests proved
negative for a pulmonary embolism, they did indicate the
possibility of bilateral atelectasis.2 In the early
afternoon of August 1, Dr. Lloyd called in Dr. Lahey and the
hospital's respiratory therapy department to assist him in
resolving Mrs. George's pulmonary condition.
Dr. Lloyd ordered that Mrs. George undergo an angiogram in
a further attempt to determine whether she had a pulmonary
embolism. Mrs. George was taken to the intensive care unit
(ICU) for an angiogram at 10:20 a.m. on August 2. The
angiogram was completed at about 1:00 p.m., at which time Dr.
Lloyd learned that the test result for a pulmonary embolism was
negative.
A nurse found that Mrs. George was having difficulty
breathing, and that Mrs. George was incoherent upon returning
1. An incentive spirometer measures the volume of air entering
and leaving the lungs. Use of the device expands a patient's
diaphragm, while also providing an incentive for a patient to
breathe more deeply.
2. Atelectasis is the collapse of an expanded lung, resulting
in an insufficient flow of air to the lung's air sacs.
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from ICU at 2:20 p.m. She did not inform Dr. Lloyd of this
condition. The charge nurse telephoned Dr. Lloyd at about 3:00
p.m. to inform him that Mrs. George had returned to OB/GYN from
ICU, but she also failed to notify Dr. Lloyd of Mrs. George's
deteriorating physical and mental condition.
At 3:00 p.m., another nurse took over the care of Mrs.
George. This nurse was a one-to-one special-duty nurse, whose
only assignment was to monitor Mrs. George's condition. At
about 3:30 p.m., a written notation was made in the chart that
Mrs. George was disoriented and incoherent. A second-year
resident physician was unable at this time to determine Mrs.
George's blood pressure and the nurses had difficulty making
Mrs. George bleed for a glucose test. Neither Dr. Lloyd nor
Dr. Lahey were informed of these adverse changes in Mrs.
George's condition.
At about 4:00 p.m., the resident physician telephoned Dr.
Lloyd to tell him that Mrs. George was febrile. Dr. Lloyd was
not informed during this conversation that Mrs. George
exhibited symptoms of hypoxia and he did not receive further
reports until being told of Mrs. George's cardiac arrest. Dr.
Lahey did not receive any further medical reports until 7:00
p.m., at which time he also was told that Mrs. George had
suffered a cardiac arrest.
The record indicates that the resident physician did not
visit Mrs. George between 5:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. The record
also shows that the special-duty nurse failed to continuously
monitor Mrs. George and to notify a supervisor of Mrs. George's
respiratory distress. Furthermore, the special-duty nurse was
not even in the room when Mrs. George stopped breathing and
suffered her first cardiac arrest.
Mrs. George stopped breathing in front of her visiting
daughter at about 7:00 p.m. The daughter then had to run out
of the hospital room in search of a nurse. A code was called
at 7:04 p.m., in which cardiopulmonary resuscitation was sought
for Mrs. George. Breathing assistance for Mrs. George was
initiated at about 7:13 p.m. During the interval between the
cessation of breathing and breathing assistance being
initiated, Mrs. George suffered a lack of oxygen to her brain.
Although her heart beat was reestablished, Mrs. George was
comatose after the cardiac arrest. Two days later, Mrs. George
died following a second cardiac arrest.
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Two of the trial court's jury instructions are at issue in
this action. The court's Jury Instruction #16A provided:
The plaintiff in this case cannot recover
against the doctors or the hospital unless
it is proven, that,
1. Dr. Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey
or LDS Hospital's nursing staff or
respiratory therapist or all of them,
based on a degree of reasonable medical
probability, failed to exercise that
degree of reasonable care and skill in
caring for the plaintiff that was
ordinarily possessed and used by others in
the respective profession practicing in
1986 in Salt Lake City, Utah, or similar
communities under similar circumstances;
2. Based on a degree of reasonable
medical probability established through
expert medical testimony from a duly
qualified medical doctor, that such
failure, if any, was the proximate cause
of the death of Betty George; and
3. That David George personally, and the
heirs of Betty George, and the
representative of the estate of Betty
George, was damaged by the negligence, if
any, of one of the defendants or all of
them.
If you do not find, by a preponderance of
the evidence, all of the foregoing
propositions with regard to either Dr.
Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey or LDS
Hospital, the party or parties, as the
case may be, against whom any one
proposition is not found cannot be found
to have committed medical malpractice and
your verdict must be in favor of the
defendant or defendants. If you find that
the evidence is evenly balanced on any of
the above-mentioned issues, then your

enninn
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verdict should be for the defendant or
defendants on whose behalf the evidence is
evenly balanced.
The court's Jury Instruction #21A provided:
You are instructed that where the
proximate cause of Betty George's death
and therefore the injury or loss claimed
by plaintiff is not established by a
preponderance of the evidence based on
reasonable medical probability from
testimony of a medical doctor, but is left
to conjecture or speculation and may be
reasonably attributed to causes over which
the hospital or doctor had no control or
responsibility/ then the plaintiff has
failed to sustain the burden of proof as
to proximate causation.
The jury returned a special verdict finding LDS Hospital
negligent in its care of Mrs. George, but not finding that the
negligence was a proximate cause of Mrs. George's death.
Plaintiffs claim on appeal that jury instructions #16A and #21A
prevented the jury from meaningfully considering the testimony
of plaintiffs' expert witnesses. Plaintiffs also claim that
jury instructions #16A and #21A precluded the jury from
awarding damages where the hospital's negligence was only a
contributing proximate cause of Mrs. George's death.
EXPERT WITNESSES
The trial court admitted the testimony of plaintiffs'
expert witnesses, respiratory therapist Donald Owings and nurse
Harriett Gillerman, to explain the hospital's duty to Mrs.
George and the hospital's breach of this duty. Owings
testified that a respiratory therapist has a duty to notify a
physician or other supervisor if a patient does not respond to
respiratory therapy. Based on Mrs. George's failure to respond
to the prescribed respiratory therapy, Owings offered his
expert opinion that the hospital's respiratory therapist
breached his duty by failing to notify the proper persons of
Mrs. George's deteriorating pulmonary condition.
Nurse Gillerman testified that ambulation and incentive
spirometry are used to prevent and treat atelectasis.
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Gillerman offered her expert opinion that the nurses, in
failing to follow physician's orders to have Mrs. George
ambulated and to use incentive spirometry on August 1, thereby
breached their duty to her. Gillerman also testified that the
nurses breached their duty by failing to perform a neurological
assessment of Mrs. George when Mrs. George showed discernible
signs of respiratory distress or hypoxia and by failing to
timely notify the doctors of her rapidly deteriorating
condition.
Defendant counters that an expert witness cannot testify
about an area of medicine in which he or she is not personally
familiar. The record clearly indicates, however, that
Gillerman and Owings testified only to the standards of care in
their respective fields. The trial court recognized these
witnesses as experts and admitted their testimony, yet the
court, through the jury instructions, prevented the jury from
considering their testimony.3
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[a]n appeal
challenging the refusal to give jury instructions presents
questions of law only. Therefore, we grant no particular
deference to the trial court's rulings." Ramon By And Through
Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989). The parties in
this case dispute the trial court's conclusions of law as
stated in the jury instructions.
This court has stated that "[i]n medical malpractice
actions the plaintiff must provide expert testimony to
establish: 1) the standard of care, 2) defendant's failure to
comply with that standard, and 3) that defendant caused
plaintiff's injuries." Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health
Care, 740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citations
omitted); see Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 351 (Utah
1980). Plaintiff's experts testified as to the hospital's
standard of care, the hospital's failure through its employees
to meet this standard, and Mrs. George's subsequent cardiac
arrest.
Courts have recognized that "[n]urses are specialists in
hospital care who, in the final analysis, hold the well-being,
3. This error was compounded by the court consistently stating
throughout trial that cause of death was not an issue in the
case and that expert testimony need not address that subject,
only to then give a jury instruction focusing on causation as
established by medical testimony.
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in fact in some instances, the very lives of patients in their
hands." Utter v. United HQSP. Center, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 213,
216 (W.Va. App. 1977), reh'q denied (1977) (negligent failure
of nurses to observe plaintiffs condition). Courts have also
recognized that a nurse may have a duty to notify her
supervisor that a life-threatening situation exists and that
failure to perform this duty may be a proximate cause of
plaintiff's additional injury. See Campbell v. Pitt County
Memorial H Q S P . Inc., 352 S.E.2d 902, 908-9 (N.C. App. 1987).
The jury must be allowed to decide whether the hospital's
failure to notify the doctors of Mrs. George's change in
medical status, which may have indicated either hypoxia or
sepsis, was a breach of the duty owed to Mrs. George. The
trial court erred in not allowing the jury to base its decision
on the plaintiffs' expert testimony. See Karriaan v. Nazareth
Convent & Academy, Inc., 510 P.2d 190, 196 (Kan. 1973), reh'a
denied (1973) (nurses' delay in notifying physician of
plaintiff's condition); see also Darling v. Charleston
Community Memorial HQSP., 211 N.E.2d 253, 258 (111. 1965),
reh'g denied (1965) (nurses failed to recognize and inform
physician of change in patient's condition, where the condition
became irreversible within a matter of hours).
PROXIMATE CAUSE
According to the hospital pathologist, the combination of
atelectasis, pulmonary embolism, and sepsis probably led to
hypoxia and this, in turn, resulted in Mrs. George's first
cardiac arrest and subsequent death. Both parties agreed that
hypoxia and sepsis were significant contributing causes of Mrs.
George's death. Plaintiffs' and defendant's expert witnesses
also agreed that sepsis and pulmonary embolism produce similar
symptoms.
Defendant argues that Mrs. George would inevitably have
died of sepsis after 2:20 p.m. on August 2, that her septic
condition was not caused by negligence, and that any negligence
on the hospital's part was therefore not a proximate cause of
Mrs. George's death.4 The medical record shows that sepsis
4. Such an argument is problematic. It would be unacceptable,
for obvious policy reasons, to permit hospitals or doctors to
escape responsibility for the negligent treatment of gravely
ill persons upon a showing that the patient's condition was
terminal and he or she was going to die anyway.
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was not diagnosed until August 3, the day after Mrs. George's
first cardiac arrest. Plaintiffs assert that the hospital's
negligent failure to notify Dr. Lloyd or Dr. Lahey of Mrs.
George's deteriorating condition at a minimum contributed to
her continued deterioration and may have hastened her death by
depriving her of the chance to receive earlier diagnosis and
treatment.
Although defendant asserts that Mrs. George's death due to
sepsis was inevitable, defendant's expert witness, Dr. Charles
Elliot, testified under cross-examination that sepsis may be
reversible. Dr. Lewis Weinstein, another of defendant's expert
witnesses, testified under cross-examination that sepsis may be
treatable, that sepsis did not occur instantaneously in Mrs.
George's case, and that prompt treatment of sepsis may
facilitate a patient's recovery. The record therefore does
support plaintiff's argument that the nurses' failure to notify
Dr. Lloyd or Dr. Lahey of Mrs. George's deteriorating condition
may well have prevented the doctors from timely diagnosing and
treating her.
"[E]vidence which shows to a reasonable certainty that
negligent delay in diagnosis or treatment increased the need
for or lessened the effectiveness of treatment is sufficient to
establish proximate cause." James v. United States, 483 F.
Supp. 581, 585 (N.D. Ca. 1980). Another court found the
defendant's assertion that operating upon the patient in a
timely manner would not have increased her chance of survival
unsupported by the record. See Hicks v. United States, 368
F.2d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1966). The Hicks court concluded that
defendant's "negligence nullified whatever chance of recovery
she might have had and was the proximate cause of the death."
Ifl. at 633.
In a case where the chances of saving a patient's life
would have been increased if a physician had been timely
notified of the patient's condition, a court found that whether
the nonfeasance of the nurses was a contributing proximate
cause of death was a question of fact. See Goff v. Doctors
General H O S P . of San Jose, 333 P.2d 29, 33 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1958). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found error in a trial
court's jury instructions because of "the unmistakable
implication in this passage that defendant's negligence had to
be the sole cause of death in order to bring liability to the
defendant when, in fact, liability could attach if the
negligence of the defendant were but a substantial factor in
bringing about the death." Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280,
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1289 (Pa. 1978) reh'g denied (1978)(original emphasis). Hamil
relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323(a)(196575
as authority for the proposition that liability may be found
where negligence increases a party's risk of harm.
A jury could have reasonably concluded that the failure of
the nurses to notify Dr. Lloyd or Dr. Lahey of Mrs. George's
change in condition prevented them from diagnosing, treating,
and possibly saving her life and that this failure therefore
was a proximate cause of her worsened condition and ensuing
death. See Morris, The Negligent Nurse — The Physician and
the Hospital. 33 Baylor L.R. 109, 116 (1981) (the significance
of proximate cause as applied to a nurse's negligence). The
trial court's jury instructions therefore improperly implied
that the jury could find only one proximate cause of Mrs.
George's death.
Based upon the errors arising from the improper jury
instructions, we reverse and remand for a new trial against
defendant LDS Hospital. The verdict of no cause of action
against the defendant doctors is affirmed.

5. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323(1965) provides that:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for
consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as
necessary for the protection of the
other's person or things, is subject to
liability to the other for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise
reasonable care to perform his
undertaking, if (a) his failure to
exercise such care increases the risk of
such harm . . . .

890171-CA
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Because we remand for new trial, it is unnecessary to reach
the other issues raised by appellant.

C2u(^Q^^

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench, Judge

Gregorfy K. Orme, Judge
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DAVID GEORGE, et al.
SPECIAL VERDICT
Plaintiff,
vs.
KIMBALL LLOYD, M.D., MICHAEL
LAHEY, M.D., and INTERMOUNTAIN
HEALTH CARE, dba LDS HOSPITAL

Civil No. C-87-4199
Judge Pat Brian

Defendant.
At the end of each proposition submitted to you, indicate
your finding by placing an "X" in the appropriate line.

If

there' is preponderance of the evidence in favor of the
proposition, indicate by finding "yes."

If there is

preponderance of the evidence against the proposition, indicate
by finding "no."

If there is no preponderance of the evidence

either way on the proposition, indicate by answering "no."
We, the jury in this action, find the answers to the
questions propounded to us, as follows:
QUESTION NO. 1
A.

Was Dr. Kimball Lloyd negligent in his care of Betty

George?
ANSWER:

Yes„

No

x

B.

If you answered "yes" to question No. 3A above, then

and only then answer the following question:

Was the negligence

of Dr. Kimball Lloyd a proximate cause of the death of Betty
George &nd the damages claimed by David George and the heirs of
Betty George?
ANSWER:

Yes

No
QUESTION NO. 2

A.

Was Dr. Michael Lahey negligent in his care of Betty

George?
ANSWER:B.

Yes

x

No

If you answered "yes" to question No. 2A above, then

and only then answer the following question:

Was the negligence

of Dr. Michael Lahey a proximate cause of the death of Betty
George and the damages claimed by David George and the heirs of
Betty George?
ANSWER:

Yes

No
QUESTION NO. 3

A.

Was LDS Hospital through its nursing staff and/or

respiratory therapists negligent in their care of Betty George?
ANSWER:
B.

Yes

^

No

If you answered "yes" to No. 3A above, then answer

the following question:

Was the negligence of LDS Hospital

including the nursing staff and/or the respiratory therapists, a

12
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proxiitate cause of the death of Betty George and the damages claimed by
David George and the heirs of Betty George?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

X

If you answered "no" to question 3A or 3B, or if you found no
preponderance of the evidence either way, then answer no further questions,
QUESTION NO. 4
What is the amount of damages, if any, sustained by David George,
and the heirs of Betty George and the estate of Betty George? Ihis question
should be answered only if you answered "yes" to question No. 3A and 3B.
General Damages
a. loss of consortium

$

b.

$

Pain and suffering of Betty George

Special Damages including:
a. Funeral and Burial expenses

$

b. Medical expenses

$

c. Lost incane, benefits and household services

$

QUESTION NO. 5
Assessing a percentage only to a party or parties found negligent,
considering the negligence to amount to 100 percent, what percentage of
negligence is attributed to:
a. Dr. Kiniball U o y d

%

b.

%

Dr. Michael lahey

c. LDS Hospital, its nurses
and/or respiratory therapists
%

Total

100

%

-3-
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Dated t h i s T ^ d a v of

A/ofetv-tev

. 1988.

V.
JURY FOREPERS

1''1

_4.

Thirci Jucicial District

MAR

2 1989
V*JWM (Y
Deputy Clerk

Brinton R. Burbidge - A049I
Larry R. White - A3446
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN
Attorneys for Defendant
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599
Telephone: (801) 521-3680

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DAVID GEORGE, individually and
as personal representative of
the Estate of Betty George, and
as personal representative for
the heirs of Betty George,

FINAL JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. C-87-4199
KIMBALL LLOYD, M.D., MICHAEL
LAHEY, M.D., and INTERMOUNTAIN
HEALTH CARE, dba LDS HOSPITAL,

Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendant.
This matter came on for trial on October 31, 1988,
before the Honorable Pat B. Brian and the juVy impaneled.

After

the close of evidence on November 9, 1988, special
interrogatories concerning the liability, if any, of the
defendants for the claims of the plaintiff were submitted to the
jury in the form of a Special Verdict.

They jury answered the

following questions as set forth below:

A tJ

Question No. 1
A.

Was Dr. Kimball Lloyd negligent in his care of

Betty George?.
ANSWER:

Yes

No

X

Question No. 2
A.

Was Dr. Michael Lahey negligent in his care of

Betty George?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

X

Question No. 3
A.

Was LDS Hospital through its nursing staff and/or

respiratory therapists negligent in their care of Betty George?
ANSWER:
B.

Yes

X

No

If you answered "yes" to number 3A above, then

answer the following question: Was the negligence of LDS
Hospital including the nursing staff and/or the respiratory
therapists, a proximate cause of the death of Betty George and
the damages claimed by David George and the heirs of Betty
George?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

X

Based on the verdict of the jury the Court determines
that a judgment of no cause of action should be entered in favor
of Dr. Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey and Intermountain Health
Care, dba LDS Hospital and against David George in his
individual and representative capacities.

1G

-2-

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.

Judgment of no cause of action should be and is

hereby awarded in favor of the defendants, Dr. Kimball Lloyd,
Dr. Michael Lahey and Intermountain Health Care, dba LDS
Hospital, and against David George in his individual and
representative capacity.
2.

That the plaintiff David George, individually and

as personal representative of the estate of Betty George and
heirs of Betty George and heirs of Betty George take nothing by
his complaint.
3.

The defendant, Intermountain Health Care, dba LDS

Hospital, should be and is hereby awarded its costs in this
action in the amount of $ Ml.

0-

.

DATED this*?-th- day of Febrtrary, 1989.
DISTRICT COURT

Pat B. Brian
District Judge

-3-

17

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Final Judgment was mailed this ^l \
""7

day of

£ ^ ^ T , 1989, by United States Mail, postage prepaid, to

the follov/ing:
Stephen Russell, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff
415 Judge Building
#8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Elliott J. Williams, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant Lloyd
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
J. Anthony Eyre, Esq.
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for Defendant Lahey
1 City Centre, Suite 330
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

6

If in these instructions, any rule, direction or idea is
stated in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is intended, and none
should be inferred by you. For that reason, you are not to single
out any certain sentence, or any individual point or instruction
as more important than the others, but you are to consider all the
instructions as a whole, and to regard each in the light of all
the others.
The order

in which the instructions

are given has no

significance as to their relative importance.

19

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

(V

The plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence each of the following propositions:
1.

That LDS Hospital, through its employees,

comply with the applicable medical standard of care,

failed to
and that in

so acting or failing to act, LDS Hospital was negligent.
2.

That

the plaintiffs to this action were injured as a

result of that negligence.
3.

That

employees,

the

negligence

of

LDS

Hospital,

through

its

was a proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the

plaintiffs.
4.

The nature and extent of the injuries and damage, and

the amount thereof.
The term "preponderance of the evidence" means the greater
weight of the evidence, that is, such evidence as, when weighed
with that opposed to it, is more convincing as to its truth.

£0
nr\r\

INSTRUCTION NO.

The plaintiff in this case cannot recover against the
doctors or the hospital unless it is proven, that,
1.

Dr. Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey or LDS

Hospital's nursing staff or respiratory therapist or all of
them, based on a degree of reasonable medical probability,
failed to exercise that degree of reasonable care and skill in
caring for the plaintiff that was ordinarily possessed and used
by others in the respective profession practicing in 1986 in
Salt Lake City, Utah, or similar communities under similar
circumstances;
2.

Based on a degree of reasonable medical probability

established through expert medical testimony from a duly
qualified medical doctor, that such failure, if any, was the
proximate cause of the death of Betty George; and
3.

That David George personally, and the heirs of Betty

George, and the representative of the estate of Betty George,
was damaged by the negligence, if any, of one of the defendants
or all of them.
If you do not find, by a preponderance of the evidence,
all of the foregoing propositions with regard to either Dr.
Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey or LDS Hospital, the party or
parties, as the case may be, against whom any one proposition i
not found cannot be found to have committed medical malpractice
and your verdict must be in favor of that defendant or

defendants.

If you find that the evidence is evenly balanced on

any of the above-mentioned issues, then your verdict should be
for the defendant or defendants on whose behalf the evidence is
evenly balanced.

JURY INSTRUCTION NO .

*/

The proximate cause of an injury is that which, in natural
and continuous sequence produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.

There may be more than one

proximate cause for an injury.

& <J
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INSTRUCTION NO.

*

You are instructed that where the proximate cause of
Betty George's death and therefore the injury or loss claimed by
plaintiff is not established by a preponderance of the evidence
based on reasonable medical probability from testimony of a
medical doctor, but is left to conjecture or speculation and may
be reasonably attributed to causes over which the hospital or
doctor had no control or responsibility, then the plaintiff has
failed to sustain the burden of proof as to proximate
causation.

O

4
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INSTRUCTION NO.

"Negligence" means the failure of a party to do what a
reasonably prudent person practicing medicine, nursing, or
acting as a respiratory therapist as the case may be, in July
and August of 1986 in Salt Lake City, Utah, or in a similar
community, would have done or would not have done under similar
circumstances.

The fault may be in acting or in omitting to act.

In the context of this case, it was the duty of Dr. Lloyd
and Dr. Lahey to exercise the same degree of care and skill in
caring for the plaintiff as was possessed and exercised by other
physicians specializing in obstetrics and gynecology and
internal medicine in Salt Lake City, Utah, or similar
communities in 1986.
You are instructed that, because of Dr. Lloyd's
specialized training, the standard of care for Dr. Lloyd in July
and August of 1986, was the same as for other specialty trained
obstetricians and gynecologists throughout the country.

The

required degree of care for him may only be established by
medical experts.
You are instructed that because of Dr. Lahey's
specialized training, the standard of care for Dr. Lahey in
August of 1986 was the same as for other speciality trained
internists throughout the country.

The required degree of care

for him may only be established bv medical experts.
o r

In addition, it is the duty of the nurses or respiratory
therapists to exercise the same degree of care and skill in
caring for the plaintiff as was possessed and exercised by other
nurses or respiratory therapists in Salt Lake City, Utah, or
similar communities in July and August of 1986.

The required

degree of care for them may only be established by nursing
respiratory therapist experts.

26

or

INSTRUCTION NO. £ 3

You are instructed that none of the defendants are
obligated in any way to insure or guarantee a successful
result.

Therefore, you may not infer or presume the existence

of negligerice merely from the fact that an adverse result arose
in the treatment of Betty George.

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

*Sl

The duty of a hospital nurse or respiratory therapist is
to exercise the same degree of care and skill in caring for a
patient as is possessed and exercised by other hospitals, nurses
or respiratory therapists of ordinary skill and learning in the
same or in a similar community in July and August of 1986.
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
The duty of a nurse or respiratory therapist extends to
caring for the patient in proportion to the physical ailments
and conditions of the patient or which reasonably should have
been known by the nurse or respiratory therapist, consistent
with the physicians instructions for treatment of the patient.

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

^

w

Doctors, and a hospital's nurses and respiratory therapists
have the duty to comply with the
the same or

similar localities as of the time of the events which

are the subject of this lawsuit.
"local" standard.

SO

standard of care applicable in

The standard of care is not a

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

<^7

A doctor, or a hospital, through its nurses and respiratory
therapists, is liable for injuries and damage proximately caused
by a failure to comply with the applicable standard of care,
however good his or her intentions may have been in treating the
patient.

00^

INSTRUCTION NO.

The amount of caution and attention required in the
exercise of a nurse's duty is measured by the patient's
condition, the danger involved in the treatment, service and
responsibility undertaken by the nurse, the information and
instruction given her by the attending physician, and other
surrounding circumstances.

These are matters for your to

consider in deciding whether or not the nurses at LDS Hospital
were negligent.

nn^.ofi

INSTRUCTION NO. ^ \
You are instructed that you are not permitted in a case
such as this to arbitrarily set up your own standards in
determining whether Dr. Kimball Lloyd, Dr. Michael Lahey or LDS
Hospital was negligent in treating the plaintiff.

You must use

the standard established by the learning, skill and care
ordinarily possessed and practiced by others of the profession
in good standing in 1986 in Salt Lake City, Utah, or in similar
localities under similar circumstances.

The doctor, hospital

nurse or respiratory therapist whose conduct is set up as the
standard is one of reasonable and ordinary prudence.

JURY INSTRUCTION NO,

?&

You must determine the applicable standard of care required
of Dr. Lloyd, Dr. Lahey, and of LDS Hospital's nurses and
respiratory therapists

only from those persons who have testified

as expert witnesses as to that standard in this case.

o 1

PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 24
If plaintiffs demonstrate that the acts or omissions of LDS
Hospital increased the risk or harm to Betty George, such evidence
furnishes a basis for you to go further and find that the
increased risk was a proximate cause resulting in the death of
Betty George, and the consequent injuries and damage suffered by
her immediate family and Estate.

AUTHORITY:
GRADEL V. INOUYE, 421 A.2d 674, 678 (Pa. 1980); HAMIL V.
BASHLINE, 392 A.2d 1280, 1288 (Pa. 1978).

PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 32
In this case plaintiffs have alleged that the acts and
omissions of LDS Hospital by and through its officers, agents and
employees resulted in the failure of Betty George to receive the
medical care necessary to save her life, and ability to continue
living in a normal and productive fashion.

Should you determine

that the negligence of LDS Hospital effectively terminated Betty
George's chance for a normal life, then you should disregard any
conjecture as to the measure of the chance for a normal life that
was eliminated.
That is, if you find that the negligence of LDS Hospital
destroyed a substantial possibility that Betty George might have
survived

and returned to a healthy, productive

state, then

defendants are liable for whatever injuries and damage was thereby
proximately caused.

AUTHORITY:

HICKS V. U.S., 368 F.2d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1966).
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Rule 48

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Effect of juror's false or erroneous answer on
voir dire in personal injury or death action as
to previous claims or actions for damages by
himself or his family, 38 A.L.R.4th 267.
Propriety of asking prospective female jurors
questions on voir dire not asked of prospective
male jurors, or vice versa, 39 A.L.R.4th 450.
Visual impairment as disqualification, 48
A.L.R.4th 1154.
Professional or business relations between
proposed juror and attorney as ground for challenge for cause, 52 A.L.R.4th 964.
Validity of verdict awarding medical expenses to personal injury plaintiff, but failing

to award damages for pain and suffering, 55
A.L.R.4th 186.
Effect of juror's false or erroneous answer on
voir dire regarding previous claims or actions
against himself or his family, 66 A.L.R.4th
509.
Examination and challenge of federal case
jurors on basis of attitudes toward homosexuality, 85 A.L.R. Fed. 864.
Key Numbers. — Jury *= 66, 72,112,114 to
121, 125, 126, 131(1) to 133, 136, 148, 149;
Trial •=> 28, 303,307,312,313,316,321,321V 2 ,
324, 325, 339, 340.

Rule 48. Juries of less than eight — Majority verdict
The parties may stipulate that the jury shall consist of any number less
than eight or that a verdict or a finding of a stated majority of the jurors shall
be taken as the verdict or finding of the jury.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 48, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Number of jurors,
§ 78-46-5.

Three-fourths of jurors may find verdict in
civil case, Utah Const, Art. I, Sec. 10.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
struction as to the number of concurring jurors
required to reach a verdict. Madesen v. Brown,
701 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1985).

ANALYSIS

Effect of Rule 47(q).
Removal of municipal officer.
Effect of Rule 47(q).
Intent of Rule 47iq) is to allow the parties
the opportunity to ensure that the requisite
number of jurors concurred in the verdict; it is
not a vehicle to bring into issue the court's in-

Removal of municipal officer.
Removal of municipal officer does not require unanimous verdict by a jury; a threefourths majority is acceptable. Madesen v.
Brown, 701 P.2d 1086 (Utah 1985).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 124
et seq.
C.J.S. — 50 CJ.S. Juries § 123; 89 CJ.S.
Trial § 494.
A.L.R. — Validity of agreement, by stipulation or waiver in state civil case, to accept ver-

dict by number or proportion of jurors less than
that constitutionally permitted, 15 A.L.R.4th
213.
Key Numbers. — Jury «=» 32(2); Trial «=»
32V2.

Rule 49. Special verdicts and interrogatories.
(a) Special verdicts. The court may require a jury to return only a special
verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact. In that
event the court may submit to the jury written interrogatories susceptible of
categorical or other brief answer or may submit written forms of the several
special findings which might properly be made under the pleadings and evidence; or it may use such other method of submitting the issues and requiring
the written findings thereon as it deems most appropriate. The court shall
give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the matter thus
128
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Rule 49

submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon
each issue. If in so doing the court omits any issue of fact raised by the
pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives his right to a trial by jury of
the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires he demands its submission
to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand the court may make a
finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in
accord with the judgment on the special verdict.
(b) General verdict accompanied by answer to interrogatories. The
court may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general
verdict, written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of
which is necessary to a verdict. The court shall give such explanation or
instruction as may be necessary to enable the jury both to make answers to
the interrogatories and to render a general verdict, and the court shall direct
the jury both to make written answers and to render a general verdict. When
the general verdict and the answers are harmonious, the appropriate judgment upon the verdict and answers shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A.
When the answers are consistent with each other but one or more is inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment may be entered pursuant to Rule 58A
in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict, or the
court may return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict
or may order a new trial. When the answers are inconsistent with each other
and one or more is likewise inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment
shall not be entered, but the court shall return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict or shall order a new trial.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 49, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Appeals.

Ambiguous interrogatories or verdicts.
Appeals.
Discretion of court.
Effect of inconsistent answers
Entering judgment in accordance with answers.
Interest.
Objections to questions.
Proximate cause issue.
Role of jury.
—Special verdicts.
Special interrogatories.
^tedAmbiguous interrogatories or verdicts.
When special interrogatories or verdicts are
ambiguous, counsel has an obligation either to
object to the filing of the verdict or to move
that the cause be resubmitted to the jury for
clarification; if a party fails to take appropriate
action before the discharge of the verdict, that
party generally may not later move for a new
trial on the ground that the verdict was defective. Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co.,
701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985).

Where plaintiff did not object below, it canraise the failure to give special verdicts or
interrogatories on appeal without showing spec j a j circumstances warranting such a review.
Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239
(Utah 1987)
not

Discretion of court.
The matter of entering judgment in accordance with the answers to special interrogatori e s i s within the discretion of the trial judge.
Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Nel^
n U t a h 2 d 253, 358 P.2d 81 (1960).
Use of a special verdict is left to the discre£ o n o f * « t r ? a l «>urt. Reiser v. Lohner, 641
^ d 93 (Utah 1982).
J t 1S W l t h i n t h e b r o a d
discretion of the tnal
c o u r t to
determine if special interrogatories
are to De use<
and
*
, if so used, the content
thereof. E.A. Strout W. Realty Agency, Inc. v.
W.C. Foy & Sons, 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1983).
The use of special verdicts or interrogatories
is a matter for the trial court's sound discretion. Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d
1239 (Utah 1987).
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Rule 51
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(Utah 1982); Wilderness Bldg. Sys. v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985); Gagon v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 746 P.2d 1194 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§§ 106 to 151; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 463 et
^QC J S
9
0 0 ; ; « — J , C.J.S. Judgments §§ 59 to 61;
88 C!JJS. Trial §§ 249 to 265
A.L.R. — Dismissal, nonsuit, judgment, or
direction of verdict on opening statement of
counsel in civil action, 5 A.L.R.3d 1405.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of counsel's
argument or comment as to trial judge's re-

fusal to direct verdict against him, 10 A.L.R.3d
1330.
Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action
^ affected by opponent's motion for summary
judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or diJ
f , *J. , % c A T „ „ , ; 1 1 0 &
***** lerdl«> 3 6 A - L * ' 3 d \ 1 1 3 ^ f
Key Numbers. — Judgment •=> 199; Trial «=»
167 to 181.

Rule 51. Instructions to jury; objections.
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably
directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on
the law as set forth in said requests. The court shall inform counsel of its
proposed action upon the requests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties
stipulate that such instructions may be given orally or otherwise waive this
requirement. If the instructions are to be given in writing, all objections
thereto must be made before the instructions are given to the jury; otherwise,
objections may be made to the instructions after they are given to the jury, but
before the jury retires to consider its verdict. No party may assign as error the
giving oH^hejaihire to give an instruction unless he objects thereto. In object
ing to the giving of an instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter to
which he objects and the grounds for" his objection^ Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and in the interests of
justice, may review the giving of or failure to give an instruction. Opportunity
shall be given to make objections, and they shall be made out of the hearing of
the jury.
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made after the court has
instructed the jury. The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case,
and if the court states any of the evidence, it must instruct the jurors that
they are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact.
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment, in the first paragraph, deleted "during
the trial" following "time" in the first sentence,
made a minor punctuation change in the second sentence, and inserted "of" in the next-tolast sentence; and substituted "jurors" for
"jury" in the second sentence in the second
paragraph.

Compiler's Notes. — This section varies
substantially from Rule 51, F.R.C.P., after
which it is patterned.
Cross-References. — Exceptions unnecessarv
> Rule 46.
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Rule 59

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Court.
—Duty.
Attachment.
Effect.
—Acceptance of full payment.
Owner or attorney.
—Vacation of satisfaction.
Hearing.
Court
—Duty.
Attachment
Court had duty to make order directing partial satisfaction ofjudgment to extent of money
collected through attachment proceeding.
Blake v. Farrell, 31 Utah 110, 86 P. 805.
Effect
—Acceptance of full payment
When plaintiff voluntarily accepted full pay-

ment of a judgment in his favor, the satisfaction and discharge operated to satisfy and discharge everything merged in and adjudicated
by the judgment. Sierra Nev. Mill Co. v. Keith
O'Brien Co., 48 Utah 12, 156 P. 943.
Owner or attorney.
—Vacation of satisfaction.
Hearing.
The recorded satisfaction of judgment signed
by judgment creditor cannot be vacated without action and hearing in equity, and the lien
of an attorney against the proceeds of the judgment does not include his personal right to execute against the judgment debtor. Utah C.V.
Fed. Credit Union v. Jenkins, 528 P.2d 1187
(Utah 1974).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§ 979 et seq.
C.J.S. — 49 C J.S. Judgments §§ 574 to 584.
A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of

judgment against one joint tort-feasor as release of others, 40 A.L.R.3d 1181.
Key Numbers. — Judgment «=» 891 to 899.

Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new
judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice.
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(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision,
or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of c o u r t Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall
specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 59, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion
for new trial, § 21-2-2.
Harmless error not ground for new trial,
Rule 61.

Juror's competency as witness as to validity
of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence,
Rule 606.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Abandonment of motion.
Accident or surprise.
Arbitration awards.
Caption on motion for new trial.
Correction of insufficient or informal verdict.
Correction of record.
Costs.
Decision against law.
Discretion of trial court.
Effect of order granting new trial.
Effect of untimely motion.
Evidence.
—Sufficiency.
Excessive or inadequate damages.
Failure to object to findings of fact.
Filing of affidavits.
Incompetence or negligence of counsel.
Misconduct of jury.
Motion to alter or amend judgment.
Motion to be presented to trial court.
Newly discovered evidence.
New trial on initiative of court.
Particularization of grounds for motion for new
trial.
Procedure for questioning grant of new trial.
Reconsideration of motion for new trial.
Settlement bars appeal.
Summary judgment.

Time for motion.
Tolling time for appeal.
Waiver.
Cited.
Abandonment of motion.
Abandonment of motion for new trial must
be intentional, and the facts must indicate this
intention. Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P.2d
1043 (Utah 1984).
Accident or surprise.
A "surprise" at trial which could have been
easily guarded against by utilization of available discovery procedures may not serve as a
ground for a new trial under Subdivison (a)(3).
Anderson v. Bradley, 590 P.2d 339 (Utah
1979).
Failure to interpose a timely objection to testimony challenged on the ground of surprise
would be a sufficient reason to deny a motion
for a new trial on that ground. Chournos v.
D'Agnillo, 642 P.2d 710 (Utah 1982).
Plaintiff was not entitled to a new trial on
the basis of surprise concerning testimony of
the defendant's expert witness where the
plaintiff failed to object to the testimony either
before, or immediately after, it was given.
Jensen v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977).
Claim of error based on accident or surprise,
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record. Bowen v. Olson, 122 Utah 66,246 P.2d
602 (1952).
Where the affidavit for publication of summons presented no evidentiary facts, a default
judgment entered against the defendant can be
attacked collaterally. Bowen v. Olson, 122
Utah 66, 246 P.2d 602 (1952).
Unauthorized appearance.
Wife who had been personally served with
process but had no actual knowledge of action
was not entitled to relief from judgment
against her and her husband on ground that
appearance for her by attorney retained by
husband was without her authority. Plaintiff
would have been entitled to default judgment
against wife, and his position could not be
worsened by unauthorized appearance over
which he had no control. Brimhall v. Mecham,
27 Utah 2d 222, 494 P.2d 525 (1972).
Cited in Goddard v. Bundy, 121 Utah 299,
241 P.2d 462 (1952); Board of Educ. v. Cox, 16
Utah 2d 20, 395 P.2d 55 (1964); Parker v.

Rolfson, 525 P.2d 612 (Utah 1974); Dynapac,
Inc. v. Innovations, Inc., 550 P.2d 191 (Utah
1976); Olsen v. Cummings, 565 P.2d 1123
(Utah 1977); Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc.,
589 P.2d 767 (Utah 1978); Peay v. Peay, 607
P.2d 841 (Utah 1980); Miller Pontiac, Inc. v.
Osborne, 622 R2d 800 (Utah 1981); Kohler v.
Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah 1981); St.
Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982);
Kanzee v. Kanzee, 668 P.2d 495 (Utah 1983);
Pease v. Industrial Comrn'n, 694 P.2d 613
(Utah 1984); Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700
(Utah 1985); In re Estate of Chasel, 725 P.2d
L345 (Utah 1986); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92
{Utah 1986); Myers v. Garff, 655 F. Supp. 1021
(D. Utah 1987); Wood v. Weenig, 736 P.2d 1053
(Utah 1987); Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d
1318 (Utah 1987); Tripp v. Vaughn, 747 P.2d
L051 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Blodgett v. Zions
First Natl Bank, 752 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App.
1988); Ramon ex rel. Ramon v. Farr, 101 Utah
Adv. Rep. 48 (1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments
§§ 200. 671 et seq.
C.J.S.— 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 228 et seq.,
237.
A.L.R. — Incompetence of counsel as ground
for relief from state court civil judgment, 64
A.L.R 4th 323.
Relief from judicial error bv motion under
F.RC.P. Rule 60(b)(1), 1 A.L.R Fed. 771.
Propriety of conditions imposed in granting
relief from judgment under Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), 3 A.L.R. Fed. 956.
Construction of Rule 60(a) of Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure authorizing correction of
clerical mistakes and judgments, orders or
other parts of the records and errors therein
arising from oversight or omission, 13 A.L.R.
Fed. 794.
Construction and application of Rule 60(b)(5)

of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizing
relief from final judgment where its prospective application is inequitable, 14 A.L.R. Fed.
309.
Independent actions to obtain relief from
judgment, order, or proceeding under Rule
60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
53 A.L.R. Fed. 558.
Lack of jurisdiction, or jurisdictional error,
as rendering federal district court judgment
"void" for purposes of relief under Rule 60(b)(4)
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 59 A.L.R.
Fed. 831.
Effect of Cling of notice of appeal on motion
to vacate judgment under Rule 60(b) of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 62 A.L.R. Fed. 148.
Key Numbers. — Judgment «= 294 et seq.,
306, 307.

Rule 61. Harmless error.
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error
or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or
by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does
not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 61, F.R.C.P.
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